Although a Twitter account associated with the Baluchistan Liberation Army, a separatist group in the sprawling and violent province of Baluchistan, said that three of its members had “embraced martyrdom” in an attack on the Chinese Consulate, certain clues indicate a concocted theory.
Clue #1 :
Pakistan was too quick to blame India
Prime Minister Imran Khan said its a conspiracy, an evil plot against CPEC. He issued a statement on Twitter insisting that such attacks could not shake the relationship between China and Pakistan. He said the strike had clearly been intended “to scare Chinese investors” and came as a result of trade agreements announced during his trip to China this month.
Clue #2 :
Baluch separatist commander Aslam Achhu said to be the mastermind of the attack, operating from a hospital in India.
As per Pakistan’s previous claims he was killed in a gun battle with security forces inMarch 2016. The then Baluchistan government’s spokesman, Anwar-ul-Haq Kakar, had also said,” I confirm the killing of a high-profile commander of the banned Baloch Liberation Army, Aslam Achu alias, in the gun battle.” “He was an Afghan Tajik and his body is now in the custody of security forces.”
Like a phoenix rising from the ashes, Pakistan is now circulating a picture of Achu on social media showing him alive and healthy recuperating at “Max Healthcare” hospital New Delhi.
Strictly abiding by their PM’s U turn policy, they now claim that apparently, Achu had fled to India after getting injured in an exchange of fire with Pakistan forces 18 months ago. Why wasn’t this info of Achu, shared earlier at other international forums by Pakistan? If they had any strong evidence, then why did Maleeha Lodhi resort to using fake pictures of Palestinians, which led to a major show down for Pakistan at UNGA in Sep 2017.
Clue #3 :
Pakistan’s old C-4 connect
C-4 explosive (Potassium chlorate) is used legally in Pakistan in the manufacturing of matches and textiles. There are approx 390 textile mills and 50 factories that make matches there, As per Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), imports of potassium chlorate to Pakistan from China and Iran have “spiked significantly” in recent years. Further reports suggests that Taliban commonly uses KCLO3 as a main charge.
IED makers have made extensive use of military explosives, whether in the form of plastic explosives such as Composition-4 (C-4), which consists of RDX explosive combined with a plasticizing agent, or munitions that are adapted for use in IEDs. Military-grade plastic explosives are desirable weapons for insurgents and terrorists as they are designed to be safe to handle, easy to use, and highly adaptable. They are also tightly controlled, so one of the primary ways they have traditionally found their way to non-state actors is through state sponsorship.
What makes Pakistan blame India squarely for the use of this explosive in the attack?
A report by Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright states that the Pakistani military’s Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is regularly accused of supporting non-state armed groups in an effort to weaken regional rival India and establish a friendly regime in neighbouring Afghanistan. In India, the use of RDX is widely seen as evidence that the ISI supported the perpetrators, on the basis that they could not have obtained the military explosive from other sources (Ghosh, 2000). In the most notable incident, the Indian authorities claimed ISI-trained militants used RDX that had been smuggled into India from Pakistan in the 11 July 2006 Mumbai train bombings, which killed more than 180 people (BBC News, 2006).
A Pakistani smuggler told a reporter in May 2010 that he was part of an operation that was bribing officials to send convoys carrying up to 85 tonnes of ammonium nitrate fertilizer into Afghanistan twice per week (Rodriguez, 2010). If this was the case, it would suggest there is strong demand for Pakistani fertilizer from Afghan farmers, as estimates have put the annual amount of fertilizer used in Afghan IEDs at around 200 tonnes (Jaffe, 2011).
Indeed, large quantities of fertilizer were being imported into Afghanistan before the ban because the country could not meet domestic demand. Pakistani fertilizer has long been a popular option as it is subsidized, meaning that traffickers can make higher profits by selling it in Afghanistan (Emerging Asia, 2009). The director of JIEDDO, Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero, said in December 2012 that more than 85 per cent of IEDs used against Coalition forces in Afghanistan contained HME, and that about 70 per cent of those (60 per cent of the total) were made from ammonium nitrate fertilizer coming in from Pakistan (Garamone, 2012)
No Chinese dead, in spite of terrorist bodies found in X ray room and inside the compound. That to on a working day, again very difficult to comprehend.
The climax of this “staged attack” was Pakistan’s Minister for Water Resources, Faisal Vawda’s James bond act. He showed up at the site in a bullet proof vest anda Glock tucked into the waistband for cameraman to film. No politician in Pakistan will do this dare devil act, all Pakistani’s can vouch for it. Surely, Mr Vawda had some sources who leaked inputs of the staged attack and he thought of it to be an ideal set up for his claim to fame act.
Balochistan is at the heart of an ambitious Chinese project, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It is no secret that Baloch separatists are opposed to Chinese working across the province, against what they see as the unfair exploitation of resources, denying the province its due rights and a form of Chinese colonisation.
However, never before have the Baloch separatists carried out attacks against Chinese officials in Karachi.
Instead religious extremists in Pakistan have reportedly killed Chinese citizens. Their anger dates back more than a decade, to the crackdown on Lal Masjid (mosque) in Islamabad in 2007, which many believe was the result of Chinese pressure on the Pakistani government. More recently, heavy-handed repression China’s Muslim majority region of Xinjiang is also stirring up anti-China sentiments in Pakistan. These factors, among others, have driven religious extremists to act against Chinese citizens in Pakistan.
Pakistan has not come out strongly in support of the Chinese Un-Islamic activities in Xianjing, due to its heavy dependence on China. The possibility that such fanatics are used for staged attacks, firstly to send a strong message to the Chinese in Pakistan, and secondly, to justify the wrong, that Pakistan is carrying out against the people of Balochistan cannot be completely over ruled.
Lastly, the timing of the plot also indicates Pakistan’s failed attempt at maligning India at IDEAS-2018; to indicate India’s role in Balochistan vis-a-vis Kartapur initiative by Pakistan.
Is China able to connect the dots, and reprimand Pakistan, or was it equally party to the staged act, that will be interesting to see.
27 Nov 18/Tuesday Written by Afsana